“Seldom in the course of military development have opinions been so conflicting as in the acquisition of this revolutionary aircraft.”[1]

This is a quote from Congress. If you have been following big dollar military acquisition programs, particularly the F‑35, this quote should not surprise you. F‑35 has been controversial to say the least. There have been questions about its capabilities, costs, and consequences. There are some who question the need for this aircraft at all and even claim this program will bankrupt the Pentagon.  Well, none of these revelations are new.  Here’s the surprising part about that quote, it’s 53 years old.

In this 1964 quote, Congress is talking about the B‑70 Valkyrie, a discontinued strategic bomber that only aviation enthusiasts know about. The plight of America’s new strategic bomber to replace the B‑52 was every bit as polarizing and political as today’s struggle to field a new tactical fighter. In order to understand the current F‑35 battle, a historical context of past political battles is critical in the fielding of large dollar systems and their strategic impact.

The F‑35 controversy is not new. What follows is a short case study about the fielding of a new strategic bomber. The similarities between this multi-decade struggle, and the F‑35’s own multi-decade struggle are striking and foreboding. The question remains, why didn’t we learn anything?

 

A New Strategic Bomber

By 1955 the USAF had become quite pleased with the performance of the B‑52. It was an effective nuclear bomber, it fit well into deterrence strategies, and it could hold its own against air defenses. But the USAF also liked the B‑58 Hustler. Its Mach 2 dash into and out of target areas was a game changer, but the Hustler did not have the payload or the range of the B‑52. The USAF decided it needed a high-speed, heavy, strategic bomber. It wanted to combine the payload and range of a B-52 with the speed of a B‑58. The result was the B‑70 Valkyrie, an aircraft that could take a 50,000 pound payload to Mach 3 at 70,000 feet. The B-70 would be the centerpiece of American strategic dominance. All was right with the USAF.

Then the Soviets launched Sputnik and the American government responded as if another Pearl Harbor had occurred. To the Eisenhower administration, Sputnik lit a fire under missile/rocket development. ICBMs were no longer a hobby, they were now a national priority. The importance of the new B-70 strategic bomber was downgraded as ICBMs became the priority. The editor of Aviation Week called this move “One of the most dangerous decisions made in this country during the past decade (1950s).”

The Air Force went into panic mode. B‑52 and B‑58 production was ramping down. As the B‑70 was the future of bombers, there were no other designs on any drawing boards. Lawmakers questioned the need for a bomber at all. The Air Force felt this decision was the first step in the White House’s plan to replace all strategic bombers with missiles. They had to fight back. Despite Ike’s direction to make ICBMs (i.e., the Atlas missile) the nation’s highest priority, the Air Force’s priority continued to be the new bomber. If the Air Force moved to adopt a missile-centric strategy, it would have to admit strategic bombing was outdated. The underlying assumption and guiding principle of the independent Air Force is strategic bombing. Tactical air does not necessarily require independence from the Army, strategic air power absolutely does. The Air Force was barely a decade old, and it faced an existential political threat. Battle lines were drawn in Congress between the missile advocates and the bomber men. Everyone in the government agreed upon the strategic goal, however those people had different views on whether either weapon could meet that objective.[2]

By 1960, Soviet surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) had shattered the invulnerability of the high-fast flyer. Gary Powers’ U‑2 demonstrated the fallibility of a high-altitude penetration strategy. The Air Force was reeling. Their entire concept of bombers was high altitude interdiction, so the USAF (i.e., Strategic Air Command) was forced into a conscious shift to low-level penetration. Radars of the time were prone to ground clutter. The closer to the ground you flew, the more your aircraft hid in the clutter of the radar display. This also made penetrating aircraft less detectable to airborne radars. Look-Down/Shoot-Down was the stuff of science fiction. The monumental Soviet strides in SAM technology were rendered moot by flying low.

However, the B‑70 could not accommodate this strategy shift. It could not achieve supersonic flight at low altitudes due to high aerodynamic drag. A low-level B‑70 was a few knots faster than a B‑52, but still subsonic, with half the range of a B‑52.[3] By 1961, ICBMs were all the rage, with none of the limitations. ICBM technology was finally capable of delivering sufficient mass and this resonated with the public and Congress. The primacy of the bomber was again called into question. During this time, the Secretary of Defense was given power over acquisition programs. Prior to this, each service was responsible for their own acquisitions and the larger Department of Defense had no real authority. Once the nation realized not every multi-billion dollar program could be funded, the Department of Defense was given the authority to start making priority calls. A new bomber was no longer the priority. On McNamara’s advice, JFK cancelled the B‑70 program.

 

A New Strategic Bomber… Again.

The USAF remained adamant it needed a replacement for the B-52, and that aircraft had to be supersonic. Only bombers could destroy hardened point targets, and only bombers were mobile enough to survive counterforce strikes. Defense and Congress countered with submarines entering the nuclear triad, taking the mobile-survivable role. ICBM accuracy had improved significantly allowing them to attack hardened point targets. Bombers ruled the Air Force, but Defense and Congress disagreed with the bomber’s supposed primacy in the strategic equation.

Apparently, the subject required study. Lots of it. In 1961 the Subsonic Low Altitude Bomber study was done, quickly followed by the Extended Range Strike Aircraft study. Unable to change McNamara’s opinion, the USAF produced the Low-Altitude Manned Penetrator study in early 1963 followed by the Advanced Manned Precision Strike System program in late 1963. This morphed into the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) program by 1964. McNamara remained unconvinced a new bomber was necessary. Between 1964 and 1968, the Department of Defense allowed upgrades to the B-52 and supplemented it with upgrades to the F-111 (which replaced the B‑58), to allow a low-altitude supersonic component. The AMSA program was limited to further study on components, no aircraft were procured. In 1968, USAF again asked that AMSA be allowed to acquire aircraft, and again McNamara denied them a new bomber. AMSA took on a new meaning in defense policy circles: “America’s Most Studied Aircraft”

Nixon’s part in overall nuclear strategy was known as flexible response. This strategy required a wide range of options, and AMSA fit that bill. The new Secretary of Defense Liard looked at the same data McNamara had, and applied flexible response. F-111s did not have the range necessary, and B-52s lacked the speed necessary, so they were not flexible enough to respond. In 1969, AMSA was rebranded as the B-1. The USAF would have 4 test prototypes by 1976, with 240 more production B-1s by 1979. It appeared the USAF was going to get a bomber with the range and payload of the B-52, with supersonic and low-altitude capability. In December of 1974, the B-1 flew for the first time. Bomber advocates had won.

Then Viktor Belenko ruined everything.[4] Belenko was a Soviet MiG-25 pilot who defected with his aircraft in 1976. He described a new interceptor, the MiG-31, equipped with look-down/shoot-down radar. Low level penetration was dead before it even got started. The low-altitude B‑1 was no better than the low-altitude B‑52. The entire program came under review. The B‑1 was vilified by the public. Jimmy Carter campaigned on cancelling the “outlandishly expensive dinosaur” that was “wasteful of taxpayers’ dollars.” During this time, the economic crisis had driven inflation rates skyward. The $40M per-unit-cost B-1 had risen to $70M per-unit by 1975. When Carter took office, the B-1 price had risen to $100M per-unit for a bomber that could not achieve its mission. Would Carter follow through on his campaign promise to cancel the B-1, or was that just political rhetoric?

After inauguration, Defense officials informed Carter of a black-world project known as the Advanced Technology Bomber or what we know as the B-2 stealth bomber. However, this technology took time to develop and field. In the interim, the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), launched from B-52s would provide equal capability of penetrating Soviet defenses as a B-1. Improving the B‑52 and fielding the ALCM would cost 20% of fielding the B-1, and provide just as effective deterrence and strike capability to holdover the Soviet threat until stealth bombers became reality. It was a slam dunk for Carter. The B‑1 was dead.

The decision was debated far and wide. NATO was pleased. While many believed the ALCM and the B‑1 provided equal capability, NATO believed the ALCM option was a far better option, not an equal one. The Air Force was shocked. They had expected Carter to limit the B‑1 buy to 150 aircraft, not cancel it outright. Republicans in Congress proclaimed “They’re breaking out the vodka and caviar in Moscow” while Congressman Robert Dornan equated cancelling the B‑1 to causing World War III.[5] However, declassified Soviet documents tell tales of despair. They would have been able to handle a new bomber, but the ALCM threat was far greater to the Soviets. The ALCM scared the Russians into massive investments in revolutionary Surface-to-Air missile systems.

During his campaign, Reagan cited the cancellation of the B‑1 as proof of Carter’s weakness. By the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, American strategy was proven incapable of responding to anything that wasn’t a full scale nuclear war in Europe. The Air Force had relented in its opinion the next war would be entirely nuclear. Therefore, the Department of Defense implemented the Rapid Deployment Forces concept, but lacked the actual capability to make it happen, especially when this non-nuclear concept was too far from the sea to allow carrier-based Naval Aviation. Long-range strategic bombers were the solution, but the B-52 was hampered by a lack of forward basing options.

Intelligence estimates told the administration the B-52/ALCM combination would be effective through 1985 and the stealth bomber would not be combat ready until at least 1995. This gap, combined with a lack of usable long-range aviation assets for Rapid Deployment Forces, led to the Long Range Combat Aircraft program. Their solution: bring back the B‑1. Reagan did just that in 1981 when he announced a 100 aircraft buy, just enough to fill the gap until the Advanced Technology Bomber project produced a combat-ready stealth bomber.

The return of the B‑1 was opposed on party lines, just like the cancellation of the B-1 was opposed on party lines. In order to make this new B‑1 (now called the B‑1B) less susceptible to look-down/shoot-down, it was equipped with an advanced electronic warfare suite and rudimentary ‘low-observable’ designs. Critics claimed the EW suite, fitted on the B‑52 provided the same capability at 5% of the cost. The faster speed of the B‑1 was irrelevant. Also, the B‑1 was only viable for a decade. However, the B‑1 could operate from a far greater range of forward locations, and was tailor-made for the Rapid Deployment Force. To appease congress, B‑1 production was spread out over hundreds of congressional districts. One would be hard-pressed to find a state that did not participate in building the B‑1. The first production B‑1 flew in 1984. By this time, the Soviets had doubled-down on SAM technology, advancing far faster than the USAF had anticipated. These advances in Soviet SAM technology made the B‑1 vulnerable before the last one was delivered in 1988.

In no way is any of this meant to slight the spectacular record of the B-1B, or the people who built, maintain and fly the aircraft. It is universally accepted today’s B‑1 is an amazing aircraft, however, it is debatable the nation needs it at all, or ever needed it. The USAF expended massive amounts of political capital and national resources to make the B‑1 happen, despite the lack of strategic needs. In the vein of “be careful what you wish for,” the Air Force got the bomber it wanted, but not necessarily the bomber it needed. The USAF received a heavy bomber with the range and payload of the B‑52, and the supersonic dash of the B‑58, combined with a low-altitude penetration capability, but was unable to fit it into larger strategic nuclear plans. Today, the B‑1 dominates conventional, regional squabbles, as evidenced by its workhorse performance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. However, it continues to struggle with a larger strategic meaning and is viewed by many as a regional theatre weapon.

Despite its obvious obsolescence, the B‑52 has yet to be replaced.

 

F-35 Parallels

“After more than a decade of controversy… the sleek new aircraft will blast into the 21st century – despite continuing questions about its cost and usefulness.”[6]

Again, this quote is not about the F‑35. This is a 1984 quote on the B‑1. But the similarities are striking. You could say this today and many will agree. Parallels between the B‑1 and F‑35 are everywhere. The B‑1 produced many lessons copied and perfected by other programs. But no similarity is as striking as the apparent lack of usefulness. The F‑35 has been called out for not being able to dogfight, not being able to execute close-air support, not being capable of executing basic missions for at least another decade, and not being any better than its predecessor. The B‑1 fielded very similar criticisms. Its low-altitude capabilities would not permit penetration of Soviet air defenses without significant suppression from nuclear missile attacks. The defensive capabilities were found lacking and its range was significantly less than advertised. Once the USAF accepted ALCMs into the inventory, the B‑1 lost the capacity to replace the B‑52. Both B‑1 and F‑35 presented with significant development problems. Both aircraft developed significant weight problems. Cracks, re-designs, software glitches, under-performance, all of these showed for the B‑1 and the F‑35 and each of these fixes were costly.

While it would be easy to call out each program for cost overruns, such an approach is not as fair as we’d like it to be. It’s easy to vilify Lockheed and the USAF, however, every program experiences cost overruns, especially those that attempt to far out reach their predecessors. The Navy used to build aircraft carriers for the cost of a single F-14. Immature technology costs money to develop. Many claim that military acquisition is not a laboratory for corporations, however that is exactly what it ends up being. When America made a conscious choice of quality over quantity during the second offset strategy, it allowed this shift in acquisitions strategy. Therefore, we are forced to accept immature technology and the growing pains it represents. The B‑1B succeeded while the B‑1A failed. By 1981 the B‑1 tech was mature enough to allow Rockwell to accept a fixed-price contract. If we want revolutionary tech, we have to accept immature things will go wrong, and we will have to pay for them.

However, this does not excuse the USAF’s and Lockheed’s mismanagement of a bloated F‑35 program. (Remember when I said it was easy to vilify them?) Immature technology has given the entire process a very legitimate excuse to cover for what some may call ‘fraud, waste, and abuse.’ What the F‑35 and the B‑1 and the B-70 have in common is not necessarily the cost overruns, but the fact their cost overruns were (are), frankly, ridiculous. The F‑35 trudges forward, seven years late and 70% over original costs. While that is certainly appalling, the B‑1A was 120% over original cost when it was cancelled.

When the B‑1A was rebranded as the B‑1B, the government and Rockwell had an opportunity to re-baseline a new program. They set a number of $20.5B (FY81) for 100 aircraft. When reality overcame that number, the government held fast to it. What they did not tell the public was that number did not include simulators, logistics, training, and other things. Officially, the B‑1B cost was $20.5B. Right on budget. However, many believe the true cost of the program was much more.[7] The F‑35 learned from that practice. When ‘cost-per-aircraft’ is talked about in today’s media, that number does not include the cost of the engine or the simulators or other factors. The B‑1 taught the contractors how to hide costs and cut corners, but the F‑35 perfected that strategy.

During the 1960s, when continually thwarted by McNamara’s opinion on a new bomber, the USAF realized it need a way to get its projects approved and render the Secretary’s opinion moot. Therefore, when the B‑1 finally became a program the USAF and Rockwell consciously spread out the contracts to include as many congressional districts as possible. 5,000 contracts were spread out over 48 states.[8] This made the new B‑1B invulnerable to its criticisms. What member of congress would willingly cancel a program that represented jobs in their home state? There are 1,300 suppliers in 45 states host 130,000 jobs, all tied to F‑35 production or assembly. Congress cannot permit such a thing to fail. They learned that from the B‑1.

Lastly, the B‑1 and F‑35 were both used as weapons in political campaigns. The Carter-Ford battle of 1976 featured the B‑1, and the sequel played out again in 1980 during Carter-Reagan. The B‑1 represented how each candidate viewed the Soviets. The Clinton-Trump battle of 2016 featured the F‑35, this time representing how each candidate interpreted the future needs of national security. Ironically, the F‑35 political battle has transcended American politics. F‑35 positions featured heavily in Canadian and Italian elections. Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti was forced to defend his position on Italian F‑35s after leading left-center candidates questioned the economics behind such a buy. Justin Trudeau’s battle against Canadian Prime Minister Steven Harper brought the F‑35 into a normally subdued Canadian view of national security. Trudeau vowed to cancel the F-35, to his benefit.

There is more history to demonstrate the US lack of ability to learn from its previous battles in the acquisition of big dollar programs. Failures in the process can help us get it right the next time around. So why can’t we learn from them?

 

NOTES:

[1] Gary Beatovich, Captain, USAF. “A Case Study of Manned Strategic Bomber Acquisition: The B‑70 Valkyrie” Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. December 1990. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a229545.pdf

[2] Beatovich, 72.

[3] Beatovich, 51.

[4] Obviously, I’m being sarcastic. Belenko’s defection was instrumental in giving our defense infrastructure a vector check. Not knowing the Russians had acquired look-down/shoot-down would have been disastrous. We would have went ‘all-in’ on the B-1A, completely passed over cruise missiles, and left ourselves without a viable attack plan. Belenko saved us.

[5] Jerry Belcher, “Dropping B-1 Would Bring World War III, Dornan Says” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 1977. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/doc/158218829.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=historic&date=Jun%2011,%201977&author=&pub=Los%20Angeles%20Times&edition=&startpage=&desc=Dropping%20B-1%20Would%20Bring%20World%20War%20III,%20Dornan%20Says

[6] Brad Knickerbocker, “B-1 Program Looks Flak-Proof Now.” Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 1984. http://www.csmonitor.com/1984/0301/030119.html

[7] Thomas Donnelley, Anand Datla, Robert Haffa. “Buying the B‑3: Procurement Reform and the Long Range Strike Bomber.” American Enterprise Institute, October 2015, pg 11.

[8] Ibid.