An Ounce of Prevention: Counter-Proliferation vs. Disarmament and what it means for North Korea

The primary focus at Air Power Strategy for 2017 will be disruptive technology. This tech is the kind that demolishes the status quo and reduces equilibrium to rubble. Disruptive tech forces all players to reassess their assumptions. No technology has been more disruptive to strategy than nuclear weapons.

With North Korea (supposedly) close to fielding an intercontinental ballistic missile and a workable hydrogen bomb that can fit on top of it, many have called for the exploration of military options to prevent a nuclear capable North Korea. Similar calls are made periodically with regards to a nuclear capable Iran. However, North Korea and Iran are on opposite sides of a very big line.

Denying nuclear capability preemptively is not a new concept, nor is the use of air power to do it. Since 1941 states have given serious consideration to attacking nuclear facilities 66 times. Of those, there have been 16 confirmed attacks on nuclear weapons facilities by state-sanctioned military forces.[1]

‘Serious consideration’ is different from political rhetoric or contingency planning. The determinant factor between rhetoric and consideration is private advocacy. A state leader, minister, or secretary lobbying or advocating military action in private meetings, absent from cameras and tweets, demonstrates consideration. In the same vein, contingency planning is not necessarily the same thing as consideration for pre-emptive action. Many states draw up contingency plans for various reasons, and the presence of a ‘military plan’ to carry out strikes is not an indicator that the state intends to do so. When a state leader privately advocates or lobbies for the use of such a plan, it changes.

The two things that deter a nation from staging attacks against another’s nuclear facilities are (1) threats of retaliation and (2) international condemnation. A statistical analysis of the 66 cases where force was used or considered against a nuclear facility says nation-states are not deterred by these factors. Even when a nation-state ultimately decided not to use force, it was not the threat of retaliation or the prospect of international condemnation that changed their minds. [2] The operational necessity of such a strike is the only factor. When Israel chose to strike against Iraq’s Osiraq reactor, the international community was united in its disgust for Israel’s actions. But that condemnation did not stop Israel from doing it 1981, nor did it stop them from doing it again against Syria’s reactor at al-Kibar in 2007. The threat of retaliation from Iraq and Syria were weak, and Israel felt the cost of such a strike was justified. When Israel chose not to strike Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1980s it was because of operational limitations, namely India’s denial of its airbases and airspace. The US similarly decided not to strike China’s nuclear program in the 1960s because the Soviet Union would not assist the US in such a strike.

Retaliation and international condemnation have no influence on a nation-state’s decision to use force against a nuclear weapons facility. However, these factors only hold when the action is taken prior to a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability. Once a nation acquires nuclear weapons, threats of retaliation cross an unacceptable threshold. Nuclear weapons are spectacularly disruptive to this status quo. No nation has ever attacked another nation’s nuclear facilities after they have demonstrated a nuclear capability. When states consider the balance of power in any conflict, a nuclear variable changes everything. This is why non-proliferation headlines US foreign policy. The less nuclear states there are, the more this type of action will remain effective.

Despite what may be broadcast and tweeted, states continue to view the use of force as an effective option to achieve non-proliferation. Using military force to prevent proliferation has proven viable. Using military force to reverse proliferation is unproven.

This is the dividing line between Iran and North Korea.

Iran has not demonstrated nuclear capability, therefore threats of retaliation and international condemnation will have no effect on another nation’s decision criteria. The only reason the US or Israel have not struck Iranian facilities is because the threat is not real, yet. When it becomes real enough, military action will occur. In the interim, economics and international pressure will continue to be effective means of dissuading Iranian weapons proliferation.

North Korea has nuclear weapons. It is questionable whether those warheads are deliverable, but they possess them none the less. The threat of retaliation becomes orders of magnitude more complex, and the only way North Korea can capitalize on any international condemnation is to not retaliate at all. In a conventional scenario, North Korean retaliation would have to be considerable with high success rates for their retaliation to be considered effective. North Korea cannot achieve this in any way absent total war. North Korea would have to target Seoul itself with massive artillery, which would bring international condemnation down on North Korea. In such a conventional scenario, North Korea loses no matter what. In a nuclear scenario, the required success drops to a single weapon. One nuclear detonation on the Korean peninsula, Japan, or the US is all it takes to demonstrate the aggressor was wrong to initiate action.[3]

The conventional prevention scenario in North Korea is no longer possible. North Korea must be treated in the nuclear scenario. Despite the US claim that a nuclear capable North Korea is not acceptable, the US accepted it when they decided not to strike prior to proliferation. A nuclear capable North Korea is reality. Achieving disarmament without nuclear detonation carries much more risk. The US must decide if the risk is too high for the potential benefits.

Disarmament is many times more difficult than prevention. Nuclear disarmament has never been attempted by a military force. The risk of retaliation and escalation is far too high, for this exact reason India and Pakistan signed a treaty in 1991 that states neither would pre-emptively attack the nuclear facilities of the other. Only four nations have ever possessed a real nuclear capability and gave it up. South Africa voluntarily disarmed to avoid international pressure, while Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine all gave up their inherited warheads because they could not afford to maintain them. Brazil and Sweden both possess the capability to build a bomb, but chose not to do so because such weapons do not help them strategically.[4]

Economics and international pressure are disarmament avenues that have worked. These still have potential applications in Iran, as well as the military option. However, North Korea has proven themselves uniquely resistant to those non-military methods. Therefore the United States should seriously consider disarming North Korea by force, despite the risks and the lack of historical data to chart a course.

 

NOTES:

[1] Nuclear weapons remain the exclusive tool of state actors and the two actors currently in question are North Korea and Iran, therefore we do not include the 80 known non-state attacks on nuclear facilities. For more info on non-state attacks see the Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. http://www.start.umd.edu/nuclear-facilities-attack-database-nufad

[2] Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear programs in War and Peace: A Qualitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2010, 54(6) 831-859.

[3] North Korea’s deterrence strategy depends on being considered irrational. This is backwards in normal deterrence methodology. See George Friedman’s analysis: https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/united-states-korea-strategy-inertia

[4] Obviously, these are oversimplifications of the intricate and complex reason for disarmament. Check out Kevin Kiernan’s piece titled “Why Do State’s Give Up Nuclear Arsenals? Proliferation as Economic Bargaining” for a more detailed look at disarmament. http://www.saisjournal.org/posts/why-do-states-give-up-nuclear-arsenals