The Battle of Quality vs. Quantity

Quality and Quantity are usually thought of together and generally regarding business. To be able to produce many of something at a high level of excellence is the strategic vision of a manufacturer. However, this battle is not without tradeoffs. The factor of time also influences the battle. Corners are cut to produce something on time, but when too many corners to increase quantity, there is a decrease in quality. Quantity over quality is not always the wrong choice conversely quality over quality is not always right either. Enough of the theoretical discussion, and look at the battle of quality vs. quality in the acquisition of weapons systems for the United States.

Most scholars and strategists agree that the F-22 Raptor is the ultimate air-to-air weapon.  There is no aircraft in existence that can defeat the F-22 in one-on-one combat.[1] But when the odds increase to two-on-one or 10-on-1 is the F-22 still the ultimate air-to-air weapon? The F-22 represents top-shelf quality, however, quantity could tactically defeat it.

The United States prefers quantity over quality and follows this predictable path with military armament all the way through WWII.  The classic example is the M4 Sherman tank.  The popularity of the Sherman was not due to its design, but its availability.  By most accounts, the M4 was not a good tank as it suffered from serious design flaws.  It was under-armored against the German Panzer IV, under-gunned against the German Tiger, and outmaneuvered by the German Panther.  When 3rd Armored Division came ashore at Normandy, it was equipped with 232 M4s.  By the end of the campaign 648 Sherman tanks were destroyed in combat and another 700 knocked out, repaired, and put back into operation, representing a 580% loss rate.[2] The American and British divisions could afford to operate M4s at a significant loss.  In this case, quantity trumped quality.

After WWII, the quantity of Soviet conventional arms was unmatchable.  The United States did have a technological advantage, and it applied scientific ingenuity to close any capability gaps.  Soon, the military services were reliant of the rapid pace of innovation, and the infamous military-industrial complex emerged.  Planners still relied on a ‘mobilization’ philosophy when it came to the numbers of weapon systems, but they also focused on maximizing the sophistication of weapons.  Over the years, this has been referred to as “gold-plating” weapon systems.  A gold-plated system is the best it can possibly be.  Gold-plated systems are expensive and risky since the technology is not mature.  The cost leads policy makers to limit the buy while the limited numbers force the system to maximize sophistication, and the system is in a loop of high cost and high complexity.  The F-14 and F-15 represented a massive leap in capability, but the costs were exponentially higher than the systems they were replacing.  In the late 1970s, technological complexity had outstripped maintenance capacity for these systems, resulting in low readiness rates for weapon systems.[3] The high cost and low readiness rate phenomenon repeats with the F-22 and B-2 in the 1990s and is currently in an advanced state concerning the F-35.

The high cost and low readiness rate phenomenon are not exclusive to aircraft systems.  The M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle, the Ford class aircraft carrier, and the Littoral Combat Ship exhibit the same tendency of high cost and low mission-capable rates.  Because of the cost of placing satellites into orbit, this phenomenon is particularly striking in space.  USA-193 was the cornerstone of the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), a $5B endeavor to build a “technologically audacious” generation of new spy satellites.[4] It became the most spectacular and expensive failure in the history of American spy satellites.  The prime contractor knew the lofty technological goals for the satellite were not achievable.  The satellite’s requirements were numerous, as various intelligence and military services competed to influence the design.[5] Real estate on a satellite was hard to acquire, and military planners needed to optimize each cubic inch.  This is the essence of “gold-plating.”  USA-193 was placed into orbit in December 2006 and almost immediately lost contact with ground stations.  In February of 2008, USA-193 was destroyed in orbit by an SM-3 missile from the USS Lake Erie (CG70) in Operation BURNT FROST.[6] This event did very little to stifle the gold-plating phenomena in regards to space vehicles.  Only cheaper access to space orbits will permit the United States to revisit the quantity vs. quality question in space.

Many times since WWII, the United States has been faced with a quality vs. quantity decision.  More often than not, the United States chooses quality.  These systems, while both spectacularly impressive and quantum leaps better than adversary forces, may not be worth the costs and risks.  There is a rogues gallery of failed military programs that were “ahead of their time.”

In today’s economy, rising costs may have finally surpassed gains in capabilities.  This has placed additional constraints on the numbers of platforms purchased.  The USAF initially wanted 750 F-22s but purchased only 187 aircraft.  Similarly, the USAF also wanted 132 B-2s but purchased only 21 aircraft.[7] The Navy wanted 55 Littoral Combat Ships but purchased 32.[8] The United States’ need to have a global force to implement its foreign policy is disadvantaged by the sheer size and scope of US foreign policy.  Initial calls for quality over quantity were specific to the NATO-Warsaw Pact front.  If the Soviets had three times as many aircraft as the US, then the US aircraft had to be three times as good, but only when in Europe.  Quality could win out over quantity when quality was concentrated.  When those limited number of aircraft are spread to the Pacific, they then had to be six times as good to maintain both balances.  When another area, like the Middle East, is added, those aircraft had to be 12 times as good.  Eventually, the quality necessary cannot be attained, and the forces available are spread too thin, no matter how good they are.  This conundrum is now present concerning 5^th generation aircraft, aircraft carriers, Navy ships, and Army brigades.  The quality of these systems is irrelevant; there are simply not enough of them.  Either the reach of US foreign policy must be curtailed to match the force structure, or the force structure has to be altered to meet the need of foreign policy.

THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR ALONE AND DO NOT REPRESENT THE OFFICIAL VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE.

NOTES:

[1] E. Heginbotham, et al. “US and Chinese Air Superiority Capabilities: An Assessment of Relative Advantage, 1996-2017,” RAND Corporation.  http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9858z3.html

[2] Nicholas Hopkins, “A Poor Defense: Sherman Tanks in WW2,” University of Illinois Archives, November 22, 2013.  http://archives.library.illinois.edu/blog/poor-defense-sherman-tanks-ww2/

[3] Richard K. Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy and Politics (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1981), 36.

[4] Phillip Taubman, “In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids,” New York Times, November 11, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/washington/11satellite.html?_r=0

[5] Phillip Taubman, “In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids.”

[6] AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense, “One Time Mission: Operation Burnt Frost,” Missile Defense Agency.” http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_one_time_mission.html

[7] T.X. Hammes, “Future War: Why Quantity Will Trump Quality,” The Diplomat, November 20, 2014.  http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/future-war-why-quantity-will-trump-quality/

[8] Christopher Cavas, “Navy, Pentagon Battle over LCS Future,” Navy Times, January 19, 2014.  http://content-static.navytimes.com/article/20140119/NEWS04/301190019/US-Navy-OSD-Battle-Over-LCS-Future