Disruptive Technology

Technology is not strategy.

Rather, it is subordinate to strategy and policy. Strategic problems should be solved by policy or strategy, not technology. Technology can shape strategy and doctrine by enabling or defeating capabilities not previously capable. But technology sometimes develops against the grain of the bureaucracy.

Disruptive technologies are those that challenge the established paradigm and their support networks. The phrase was devised by Christensen and Bowser in their 1995 article Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave.[1] Such a topic would seem to be better suited for a technological publication, however this was geared towards business leaders and management executives. Why? Because these are the people that make the money decisions. The people that develop technology (scientists and researchers) do not make the buying decisions. The authors go to great lengths to recognize that the technology itself is never disruptive, but it is the way that technology is applied that creates disruption in the system. Zeleny further describes the true disruption comes from the support network that has grown around the established technology or system.[2] The relationship between technology and strategy, especially with regards to air power, is strikingly similar.

In military matters, the scientists and researchers do not make the decisions. The policy makers do. They decide what weapons to buy, what technologies to pursue, and what projects to sink. For example, the entire United States military establishment soundly rejected cruise missiles. The long-range ALCM [3] was forced upon the USAF. The ground launched cruise missile was similarly forced upon the Army, which refused responsibility for development and, in turn, forced it on the Air Force. The Navy similarly rejected the Tomahawk. The ALCM threatened the primacy of the Bomber in air power doctrine and strategy. At each level of development, the cruise missile was aborted by the Air Force only to be forcibly resurrected by Congress.[4] The military services’ parochial outrage to cruise missiles flew in the face of political realities. The White House, Department of Defense, Department of State, Congress, and US allies in Europe were all in lock-step agreement that further arms control discussions would fail miserably if this new technology were not fully exploited. Cruise Missiles were a political necessity. The government fought hard for this technology to solidify the SALT agreements knowing that this was a technology and a capability the services did not want.^[5] The cruise missile disrupted the established system, but the policy makers were not looking for a military weapon per se, they were looking for a policy weapon.

Disruptive Technology is a real problem for the USAF in particular. The military forces have a long history of believing that its technological prowess is a guarantee of victory while promoting technology for technology’s sake absent a strategic context, none more so than the USAF. As new technologies are being researched, the US must take a hard look at the strategic implications of each. Does fielding a hypersonic aircraft disrupt our ability to keep space de-militarized or does it enhance it? Does boost-glide weapons make us strategically safer, or more vulnerable to another arms race? Does autonomous aircraft make the USAF better or worse? These are the types of questions discussed in this main thread at Air Power Strategy. In the coming weeks and months our authors will continue to tackle the strategic implications of disruptive technology. Because disruptive technologies are not necessarily bad, but they are if you’re not ready for them.

THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR ALONE AND DO NOT REPRESENT THE OFFICIAL VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE.

NOTES:

[1] Bower, Joseph L. & Christensen, Clayton M. 1995. “Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1995.

[2] Zeleny, Milan. 2009. “High Technology and Barriers to Innovation: From Globalization to Localization.” International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making. World Scientific.

[3] Air Launched Cruise Missile

[4] I apologize for this ridiculous oversimplification of the Cruise Missile dilemma that faced the United States in the 1970s. You will see this topic again, in much more detail, when the Hypersonic Cruise Missile is discussed.

[5] Betts, Richard K. 1981. Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy and Politics. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute. Pg 360-362.